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paul nugent
STATES AND SOCIAL 
CONTRACTS IN AFRICA
F
or perfectly understandable reasons, much writing 
about contemporary Africa has focused on instances where 
there has been a partial or complete breakdown of central 
authority—as was true of Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 
1990s or is the case in Somalia today—or where predatory rulers holed 
up in capital cities have lived off the rents derived from oil and min-
ing enclaves: for example Chad, Congo-Brazzaville or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (drc).1 Accounting for the more extreme conﬁgura-
tions is a necessary exercise, as is the effort to explain how a degree of 
normality is possible in the absence of a functioning state.2 What is prob-
lematic is when these cases are made to stand for Africa as a whole. There 
has been a trend in recent scholarship to posit a pattern common to pretty 
much all African countries, with the possible exception of Mauritius, 
Botswana and South Africa: namely endemic levels of clientelism, which 
turn all government institutions into ciphers of particularistic interests 
and have an in-built dynamic towards chronic instability.3
Accompanying this inclination to ﬂatten the African landscape, there 
has been a movement away from investigating institutions towards a 
narrower concern with how networks function. Indeed, many contribu-
tions that are ostensibly about the state are really dealing with something 
entirely different. For example, Jean-François Bayart’s The State in Africa 
has a great deal to say about conceptions of power, but it tells us surpris-
ingly little about the state in Africa—at least in an institutional sense.4 If 
pushed, the authors in question would no doubt insist that the state is so 
impregnated with societal interests that it can only be studied as embed-
ded within society rather than being artiﬁcially separated from it. In this 
vein, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz conclude:
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Hence, the notion that [African] politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs 
should be the servants of the state does not make sense. Their political 
obligations are, ﬁrst and foremost, to their kith and kin, their clients, their 
communities, their regions, or even to their religion. All such patrons seek 
ideally to constitute themselves as ‘Big Men’, controlling as many networks 
as they can . . . We are thus led to conclude that, in most African countries, 
the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the 
realities of deeply personalized political realities.5
In a subsequent collaborative work, they reiterate that the existence of 
the state is not something inevitable or normal, but grew out of a very 
particular European history. To this day, they maintain, the formal exist-
ence of a state in somewhere like Nigeria is confounded by the reality of 
quite different logics at play.6 Forget trying to apply Western concepts to 
African realities, we are told, and focus on what is actually happening. 
This may sound like wise advice, but the reality is that the amount of 
research which actually traces how networks function—rather than 
merely asserting their existence—is surprisingly limited outside of the 
cases of the oil-rich states. The most recent work on the state has (sig-
niﬁcantly perhaps) been carried out by anthropologists rather than by 
political scientists, and often tends to support the view that institutions 
1 The literatures are too vast to capture here, but indicative are David Keen, Conﬂict 
and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford 2005; Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West 
Africa: The ruf and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, London 2005; Stephen Ellis, 
Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African 
Civil War, London 1999; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, 
co 1999; and, for the oil states, Ricardo Soares de Oliviera, Oil and Politics in 
the Gulf of Guinea, London 2007. There is a whole research industry on ‘failed 
states’, in which Africa features most prominently. See, for example, I. William 
Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, 
Boulder, co 1995; Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 
Washington, dc 2003 and State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 
Washington, dc 2003; and Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A 
Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, New York 2008.
2 For example, Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, Oxford 2003. 
3 Two parallel accounts are Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, 
The Criminalization of the State in Africa, Oxford 1999; and Patrick Chabal and Jean-
Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, Oxford 1999.
4 Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, London 1993.
5 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, pp. 15–6. 
6 Chabal and Daloz, Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning, 
London 2005, pp. 261–8.
nugent: African States 37
remain rather important.7 Despite the realities of everyday corruption 
and chronic inefﬁciency, there is a surprisingly deep-seated attachment to 
bureaucratic rules and behaviour.8 These may be honoured in the breach, 
but they remain a constant frame of reference for the actors concerned, 
and not just because they can be manipulated for personal gain. The most 
interesting set of questions is how institutional structures are moulded 
to deal with everyday realities, such as the scarcity of manpower and 
logistics (including uniforms, petrol, vehicles and telephones) and the 
inadequacy of ofﬁcial remuneration. The underlying message here is that 
institutions in Africa are not elaborate ﬁctions or a cover for something 
else, but help to inform the behaviour of ofﬁcial and non-state actors alike 
in fundamental ways. Ticking off African states against a checklist of cri-
teria derived from an ideal-type, and then ﬁnding them wanting, may 
create the appearance of instilling greater analytical rigour, but in reality 
it closes down an analysis of how institutions actually work.
‘Bringing the state back in’ has become a cliché, but undoubtedly there 
is a need to integrate an analysis of social dynamics with a closer exami-
nation of African state logics. This entails a number of overlapping 
agendas. Firstly, there is a need to return to a sustained study of political 
phenomena at different levels simultaneously—that is, local, regional, 
national and indeed trans-national. Although the ﬁrst two used to be the 
preserve of a rather conventional American political science, a multi-
level approach is fundamental to any attempt at understanding African 
politics. Secondly, the role of the state in mediating the production and 
reproduction of social inequalities—which has become lost in a rather 
mushy literature about neo-patrimonialism—should receive far greater 
attention than it presently does. Finally, there is a need for a comparative 
approach that does not conﬂate experiences, but opens up the possibil-
ity of understanding a range of phenomena across African countries as 
well as a mechanism for understanding the salient differences. In what 
7 Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, ‘Powers in the Village: 
Rural Benin between Democratization and Decentralization’, Africa, vol. 73, no. 2, 
2003, pp. 145–73; and Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur, eds, The Governance 
of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services, 
Leiden and Boston 2009; for an account of bureaucratic activity, see Brenda Chalﬁn, 
‘Cars, the Customs Service and Sumptuary Rule in Neoliberal Ghana’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, vol. 50, no. 2, 2008, pp. 424–53.
8 On corruption, see Giorgio Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and 
the State: Citizens and Public Ofﬁcials in Africa, London 2006.
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follows, I wish to demonstrate, primarily through a comparison of four 
West African countries—Ghana, Togo, Senegal and the Gambia—how 
a return to political economy can help to create a more complex pic-
ture of how African states and peoples have engaged with one another. 
These examples cannot stand for Africa as a whole, but they do provide 
an insight into the workings of countries where the state has not col-
lapsed or been skewed by the ﬂow of oil rents. The article falls into four 
parts. In the ﬁrst, I brieﬂy sketch out the existing landscape of writing 
on African states in order to be able to better position my own interpre-
tation. I then turn to a comparison of colonial states and their enduring 
legacies. In the third section, I examine the reasons why many of the 
social contracts became untenable in the last decades of the twentieth 
century. Finally, I deal with the potential for the emergence of new social 
contracts in contemporary Africa.
1. writing the african state
The central question that underlies most of the literature on African 
states is why they have proved to be such weak Leviathans or, phrased 
in more normative terms, why they have failed to generate meaning-
ful public goods. The answer is typically sought in some combination 
of historical and structural factors. On the resolutely historical side of 
things, Jean-François Bayart seeks an overarching explanation in a his-
tory of African ‘extraversion’ dating back to the era of the slave trade, 
which warped African institutions in fundamental ways.9 Whereas his 
account takes the long view, many still continue to insist on colonialism 
as the operative watershed. Hence it has been argued, in a stronger and 
a weaker version by Basil Davidson and Patrick Chabal respectively, that 
pre-colonial traditions of statecraft were fractured during the colonial 
takeover.10 The result was that imported institutions lacked basic legiti-
macy, while the indigenous forms that were permitted to continue were 
stripped of their mechanisms of accountability—coming to embody what 
Mahmood Mamdani has described as ‘decentralized despotisms’.11
9 Bayart, ‘Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs, vol. 99, no. 
395, pp. 217–67.
10 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, 
London 1993; Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, London 2008, 
pp. 92–3.
11 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism, Princeton 1996.
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Crawford Young has also emphasized the heavily coercive character 
of the early colonial state and the manner in which certain habits of 
violence have continued down to the present. This is an interpretation 
that draws deeply on the author’s work on the drc, for which it has the 
greatest resonance alongside early iterations of the settler state in east-
ern and southern Africa.12 Whereas Young and others have highlighted 
a glaring lack of hegemonic pretensions in the vastness of the Belgian 
Congo, Joshua Forrest reveals how the travails of Guinea-Bissau since 
independence have to be viewed in the light of the singular failure of the 
Portuguese colonial state to make its writ run in the tiny enclave.13 While 
older literatures on the liberation wars against the Portuguese posited 
that the very need to mobilize the rural population would help to forge 
new kinds of structures of popular power, the Lusophone countries have 
not looked so distinct in the long run.14 The differences that are apparent 
in some post-liberation states arguably have less to do with the state per 
se than with the mentalities of the leaderships who have tended to equate 
the interests of the movement with those of the nation. This is starkly 
apparent in Eritrea, following its war of ‘liberation’ from Ethiopia, but it 
is also evident in Zimbabwe and Angola. 
On the structural side of things, explanations can be subdivided into 
those that are basically architectural and others that emphasize neo-
patrimonial logics. For Jeffrey Herbst, the challenge is to account for the 
differential capacity of African states to ‘broadcast’ their power across 
national space.15 His contention is that the demographic reality of highly 
dispersed populations has created an impediment to effective govern-
ance. Herbst notes that Africa’s largest states tend to face the problem in 
an exaggerated form, with pockets of relatively dense population often 
separated by great distances. For this reason, they have been the most 
prone to failure.16 By stark contrast, Catherine Boone starts from the 
12 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven 
1994, pp. 124–40.
13 Joshua Forrest, Lineages of State Fragility: Rural Civil Society in Guinea-Bissau, 
Oxford 2003.
14 See, for example, Davidson, Liberation of Guiné: Aspects of an African Revolution, 
London 1969; and Eye of the Storm: Angola’s People, London 1973.
15 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control, Princeton 2000.
16 For a comparison of the record of the largest states, see Christopher Clapham, 
Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, Big African States: Angola, drc, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Sudan, Cambridge 2006.
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position that it is not necessarily the concern of those who govern to 
project state power to all corners of their territory. They may be content 
to leave entire regions to their own devices if they are of no material 
importance to the centre. The operative question then becomes: under 
what circumstances do states choose to engage with their populations 
in an active way? Boone’s answer stresses extractive imperatives on the 
one hand, and the existence of powerful local elites capable of hard bar-
gaining on the other. When state imperatives run up against the reality 
of cohesive local interests, she maintains, some form of negotiation is 
likely to ensue.17 Her approach does not necessarily contradict that of 
Herbst—after all, sheer distance may impinge on the willingness of the 
state and local elites to engage each other—but it focuses attention much 
more on the speciﬁcs of bargaining between the state and societal actors. 
Boone’s account also has the great merit of placing revenue extraction at 
the centre of the analysis.
Finally, Pierre Englebert invokes elements of the colonial legacy in what 
remains essentially a structuralist interpretation. He attributes the fail-
ings of African states to weak capacity, which is diagnosed as a symptom 
of limited legitimacy. This is in turn attributed to colonialism, which 
divorced pre-existing governing structures from the state that was inher-
ited at independence:
Of all the regions of the world, Africa has the highest proportion of coun-
tries where the process of state creation was exogenous to their societies and 
where the leadership or ruling class inherited the state rather than shaping 
it as an instrument of its existing or developing hegemony. As a result, 
African states were born lacking legitimacy, meaning simply that they were 
not endogenous to their societies; they were not historically embedded into 
domestic relations of power and domination.18
There is some echo here of Davidson’s lament about the failure of 
post-colonial states to build on indigenous political cultures. Englebert 
distinguishes between vertical legitimacy, which comes down to the 
degree of ﬁt between society and the political institutions, and horizon-
tal legitimacy, which is about the level of consensus about who ought to 
partake in the social contract. In a nutshell, colonial regimes that rode 
roughshod over indigenous institutions tended to bequeath states with 
17 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority 
and Institutional Choice, Cambridge 2003, pp. 240–82.
18 Pierre Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa, London 2000.
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low vertical legitimacy, while colonial borders that cut through African 
peoples in an arbitrary way were not conducive to horizontal legitimacy. 
Where states have lacked fundamental legitimacy, which he sets out to 
measure in quantitative terms, Englebert ﬁnds that the ruling elites have 
tended to engage in neo-patrimonial practices to garner political sup-
port. He maintains that the African states with the most positive records 
were either constructed on the foundations of pre-colonial chiefdoms/
kingdoms (notably Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana) or they were 
islands populated, and thus effectively forged from scratch, through the 
European encounter (Mauritius and Cape Verde). Herbst might observe 
that these all happen to be small states, but then building on existing poli-
ties made such a conﬁguration inevitable. The problem with Englebert’s 
account, which is common to that of Davidson as well, is that ‘endogenous 
institutions’ are a black box that is never really opened up. If Chabal is 
right in saying that pre-colonial states were built on personal ties rather 
than bureaucracy, then this somewhat complicates the analysis.19 
Turning brieﬂy to neo-patrimonialism, there is a growing body of litera-
ture that regards state failure as arising out of the strategies of ruling 
elites. As has already been noted, Chabal and Daloz regard African polit-
ical actors as manifesting a weak commitment to bureaucratic norms 
because these are constantly undercut by the need to service social net-
works. Their account, which emphasizes a progressive weakening of the 
state in recent decades, bears a close resemblance to that of Bayart, Ellis 
and Hibou. Here too, social networks are seen as deeply embedded in 
the state, to the extent that the latter effectively becomes captive to crimi-
nality. However, their account also couples the crisis of the African state 
with new global forces that have created unprecedented opportunities 
for illicit wealth extraction—in essence, the latest manifestation of extra-
version. In the words of the authors:
The criminalization of politics and of the state may be regarded as the 
routinization, at the very heart of political and governmental institutions 
and circuits, of practices whose criminal nature is patent, whether as 
deﬁned by the law of the country in question, or as deﬁned by the norms 
19 Chabal and Daloz, Culture Troubles, p. 264. There has been some debate about 
how far a kingdom such as that of Asante rested on an impersonal bureaucracy. 
Compare Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution 
of a Political Order, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1989, and the critiques by T. C. McCaskie, 
State and Society in Pre-Colonial Asante, Cambridge 1995; and Larry Yarak, Asante 
and the Dutch, 1744–1873, Oxford 1990.
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of international law and international organizations or as so viewed by 
the international community.20
The growing literature on resource-rich countries points to the manner 
in which rents can fundamentally re-shape the ways in which the state 
relates to its population. The leading oil-producing countries—Nigeria, 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea—exhibit the most extreme forms of extra-
version, with political elites drawing little or no tax revenue from their 
populations and needing to pay minimal attention to them. Although 
the state may be considered as weak in formal bureaucratic terms, the oil 
rents enable core institutions to function and to reproduce the elites that 
are entwined with them. In Angola, we have the classic instance of how 
oil money has forged cosy connections for leaders with one foot in the 
ruling party and/or government and another in private business.21
Rulers and ruled
In the rest of this article, I will not dwell further on the resource-rich 
states or the cases where the state has effectively ceased to function. I 
will instead concentrate on instances where states do engage their popu-
lations, and will offer an explanation for why this assumes rather varied 
forms. Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to sharpen the focus. 
Although there is a large body of writing that stresses the historical roots 
of the present, there is relatively little that seeks systematically to account 
for the reproduction of state institutions or modes of operation over time. 
Frederick Cooper comes closest by showing how relatively weak states at 
the moment of independence were maintained through the perform-
ance of gatekeeper functions.22 But there is still much more to be said 
about repertoires of state power as well as continuities in thinking about 
the political realm. Secondly, while geopolitical explanations are more or 
less convincing in their detail, neo-patrimonialism tends to have limited 
explanatory power, in part because it is invoked as both the cause and 
the effect of a dysfunctional politics. There are precious few attempts to 
show exactly how leaders channel resources to service their power bases 
or how their constituents conceive of, and act upon, the power dynamic 
20 Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, Criminalization of the State, p. 16.
21 See Tony Hodges, Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism, 
Oxford 2001.
22 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present, Cambridge 2002.
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in their own right. The otherwise stimulating Francophone literature 
on politics from below is pretty much silent on this score,23 whereas 
the Anglophone focus on the politics of ethnicity is more convincing in 
its depiction of high politics around election time than in unravelling 
ongoing political networks.24 Here, I will avoid neo-patrimonialism as 
a concept and will concentrate on the interaction of three key variables 
in the political economy of Africa over the course of the past century: 
namely revenue streams, control of land and population, and adminis-
trative capacity. These three together have helped to shape signiﬁcantly 
different social contracts.
Social contracts in Africa have to be seen as the product of historical 
compromises forged out of relations of opposition, and not a little con-
ﬂict. I distinguish between three kinds of contract from the colonial 
period to the present: coercive, productive and permissive. A coercive 
social contract is one in which the right to govern is predicated on the 
capacity of the rulers to render intolerable the lives of their subjects. In 
extreme cases, the contract may look more like a statist version of a pro-
tection racket in which people surrender their political voice in return 
for being spared from predatory acts. The mode of extraction is typi-
cally some form of tribute levied in a manner that is personalized rather 
than routinized. A productive contract is one in which the sovereign 
authority and the subjects/citizens enter into some form of negotia-
tion over how the rule by the former can contribute to the well-being 
of the latter. This often involves negotiation over the payment of taxes 
as well as rights of access to scarce resources, including land.25 Finally, 
23 On politics from below, the work that set the agenda is Bayart, Achille Mbembe 
et al., Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire, Paris 1992. One possible reason why 
this agenda did not take root in the manner of Subaltern Studies among scholars 
of South Asia is that the protagonists did not follow through with detailed studies, 
while Anglophone researchers paid relatively little attention to the approach that 
was being advocated.
24 One of the best studies of how patron–client ties operate, in this case across 
ethnic lines, is Jennifer A. Widner, Rise of a Party State in Kenya: From ‘Harambee’ 
to ‘Nyayo!’, Berkeley 1992. A useful recent collection on ethnicity and politics is 
Bruce Berman, Peter Eyoh and Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, 
Oxford 2004.
25 On taxes, see Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley 1988. For an ambi-
tious comparative analysis, see Lane F. Fargher and Richard E. Blanton, ‘Revenue, 
Voice and Public Goods in Three Pre-modern States’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, vol. 49, no. 4, 2007.
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a permissive contract represents a kind of half-way house. While the 
governing authority claims its sovereign rights, it chooses not to exer-
cise them (or all of them), in return for securing a measure of de facto 
compliance. This does not necessarily undermine state power because it 
is understood as a deal that the governing authority could renege upon 
at any point. Its strength often lies in the fact that it cuts both ways: that 
is, the rulers can be less accountable in return for not harassing the 
population concerned. The dilution or diminution of peripheral states’ 
sovereignty within the international order remains, of course, a vital 
question. In what follows, however, the issue of ‘semi-sovereignty’ will 
simply be noted, as a matter of empirical reality, in order to focus on the 
state’s actual executive, legislative, juridical and administrative scope.
2. building blocks
Although colonial rule was frequently justiﬁed in terms of a grand civ-
ilizing mission, the reality was more mundane. The desire to mould 
Africans to European designs was tempered by the appreciation that 
this would produce a great deal of conﬂict, necessitating the investment 
of resources in repressing African dissent and/or curbing evasion.26 
Without ever admitting as much, colonial regimes generally settled 
for less. It was only during the decade after the Second World War that 
the imperial metropoles made resources available for more ambitious 
projects of social engineering in Africa.27 In each colony, the adminis-
tration found its own level. The cardinal principle was that the colonies 
should pay for themselves. In those colonies where the state was weak-
est, such as in Guinea-Bissau, the revenue imperative forced colonial 
states to raise income by any means possible. In these cases, indicative 
of the coercive contract, tax raids were a common expedient. A rule of 
thumb that is broadly valid is that colonial violence was inversely propor-
tional to the level of effective bureaucratic control.
The Gold Coast (Ghana) is of particular interest because it provides an 
example of the limits placed on colonial state power by African agency. 
26 Anne Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa, London 
1989. Where the colonial project was crudely extractive, as it was in Leopold’s 
Congo or in Mozambique during the era of the concessionary companies, violence 
was systemic.
27 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and 
British Africa, Cambridge 1996; and Cooper, Africa Since 1940, pp. 66–132.
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As Anne Phillips has demonstrated, the late nineteenth-century rhetoric 
of developing the colonial estates was not translated into practical results 
because of concerns about what it might cost to implement. In the Gold 
Coast, an additional problem was that the population did not regard 
itself as having been colonized. In the view of coastal chiefs and intel-
lectuals, the Bond of 1844 provided the founding charter for the colony. 
Their contention was that the British had been contracted by the Fante 
chiefs to carry out a strictly limited range of functions, mostly pertaining 
to the administration of justice. On this interpretation, the colonial state 
only exercised the powers that had been expressly ceded to it, whereas 
the residual rights of Gold Coasters remained inviolate. To quote J. E. 
Casely-Hayford from a book written in 1903:
I may broadly state that the relations between Great Britain and the Gold 
Coast originated in friendship, mutual trust and commercial alliance. It 
will be seen, therefore, that the people have a right to mould their institu-
tions upon their own lines, Great Britain merely being a Protecting Power, 
and only properly concerned with their relations with the outside world. It 
will also be seen that at no time have the people divested themselves of their 
right to legislate for themselves.28
Although Asante was defeated by force of arms, southern intellectuals 
noted that its incorporation into the colony had been fully supported by 
them in the interests of liberating the Asante from their own rulers. In 
that sense, the indigenous population regarded themselves as partners 
in extending the boundaries of the Gold Coast. After 1900, therefore, 
an ‘unwritten constitution’ was transported northwards. It was really 
only in the Northern Territories (nts), which the British acquired by 
treaty—signiﬁcantly contracted by a Fante intermediary, George Ekem 
Ferguson—that it became possible for the British to insist on an 
absolute right to rule. 
There were two deﬁning moments for the colonial project, which are 
still pregnant with meaning to this day. The ﬁrst was the ill-fated attempt 
to introduce a poll tax to cover the costs of the administration in the 
1850s. Popular resistance to this measure put paid to the possibility of 
implementing direct taxation, which made the Gold Coast singular in the 
history of modern empires. The second moment came in the 1890s with 
the defeat of British efforts to introduce legislation vesting the control of 
28 J. E. Casely-Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions With Thoughts on a Healthy 
Imperial Policy for the Gold Coast and Ashanti [1903], London 1970, p. 129.
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land in the colonial state. The Lands Bill of 1897 was opposed by south-
ern chiefs and intellectuals who despatched a delegation to London to 
voice their objections. The offending legislation was withdrawn, even if 
state control of lands was later introduced in the Northern Territories.29 
The British defeat on such a core issue underlined the central conten-
tion that the chiefs retained their residual powers and were partners of 
the British rather than their instruments. 
Not to put too ﬁne a point on it, the British ran away from a ﬁght. The net 
result was that colonialism could never rest on simple predation, or even 
a presumed right of command. Consent was hammered out in a seem-
ingly never-ending series of negotiations over the reciprocal rights of the 
colonizer and the indigenous population. Although the British lost some 
face, they reconciled themselves to this arrangement because ultimately 
it was cost-effective. While the colonial state did not control southern 
lands and could not collect direct taxes, other sources of revenue were 
found. The British levied mining royalties, but these were much less 
important than the revenues derived from duties on imports and exports. 
As the cocoa economy boomed in the second decade of the twentieth 
century, and Gold Coasters became avid consumers of a wider range of 
imported goods, substantial revenues ﬂowed into government coffers. 
In the long run, this helped to shape a distinctive conﬁguration of power. 
Indirect taxes were capable of sustaining a dense fabric of administra-
tion by West African standards, which was reinforced by the ﬁrst attempt 
actively to promote a ‘development’ agenda in the 1920s. By comparison 
with most African colonies, there was a relatively good network of roads, 
schools and health facilities in the southern half of the colony by the end 
of that decade.30 Although the colonial state was in some respects highly 
extraverted—resting as it did on customs duties whose bounty depended 
on swings on the global commodity market—there was a sustained and 
29 On opposition to the Lands Bill, see David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: 
The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850–1928, Oxford 1963, pp. 330–58. On north-
ern lands, which reverted to communal tenure in 1979, see Christian Lund, Local 
Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa, Cambridge 2008, pp. 51–4.
30 The best collection of basic data remain that of G. B. Kay, ed., The Political 
Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: A Collection of Documents and Statistics 1900–1960, 
Cambridge 1972. A standard work, which has stood the time less well, but still has 
useful things to say about state interventions, is Rhoda Howard, Colonialism and 
Underdevelopment in Ghana, London 1978, especially chapter 5.
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reasonably productive interaction between ruler and ruled. In that sense, 
Bayart’s model is rather too one-dimensional.
This outcome gifted three legacies to independent Ghana, amounting to 
a relatively stable social contract without which it is impossible to under-
stand the politics of that country today. The ﬁrst was the entrenchment of 
the cardinal principle that the state had circumscribed limits, which were 
at once spatial and institutional. The Nkrumah regime made an attempt 
to redeﬁne these limits in the early 1960s. The crumbling remains of 
post ofﬁces, police stations and health centres are physical reminders of 
the attempt to intrude further into the lives of rural communities. After 
the fall of Nkrumah, successor governments settled back into default 
mode. There were Regional administrations (numbered at ten since the 
1980s) and their District equivalents, but outside of the District capitals 
state power was negotiated rather than presumed. Hence, the District 
Secretary/Chief Executive worked through the good ofﬁces of the chiefs, 
whose sense of being masters of their own domain was as pronounced 
as ever. It was considered quite normal for ofﬁcials to come to the palace 
to contract business.
This would have been unthinkable in a country like Togo where the 
same historic compromises were never struck. There, the Germans and 
later the French routinely re-scrambled the boundaries of administrative 
units to suit themselves. After independence, Togolese chiefs contin-
ued to be treated as lesser state functionaries: they exercised devolved 
responsibilities including oversight for law and order and the arbitration 
of local disputes, but they remained beholden to the préfet who embod-
ied executive power at the local level.31 In Ghana, chiefs have never been 
part of the state apparatus and thus have never taken orders. Moreover, 
Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution explicitly recognizes the preroga-
tives of traditional rulers, formally removing the right of government to 
interfere in the chieﬂy domain. The makers of the constitution (perhaps 
wisely) avoided trying to deﬁne the boundary between chieftaincy and the 
state, but everyone recognizes that one exists. Today, elected politicians 
31 For a study of how power has operated in post-independence Togo, see Comi 
Toulabor, Le Togo sous Eyadema, Paris 1986. For a closer analysis of chief–state rela-
tions, see E. Adriaan B. Van Rouverory van Nieuwaal, L’état en Afrique face à la 
chefferie: le cas du Togo, Paris 2000. 
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routinely defer to the chiefs, who may be unelected, but lay claim to a 
deeper wellspring of legitimacy. 
A second legacy is the pre-emptive rights attaching to the autochthons—
or more accurately the ‘landlords’, given that the traditions of most 
societies include narratives of settlement in a remote past. Although 
there has been considerable southward migration since colonial times, 
in the direction of the cocoa belt and the cities, the status attached to 
being a ‘stranger’ is absolute. Within a given community, a stranger may 
enjoy some of the prestige that goes with possessing wealth or educa-
tion, but she is also expected to accept an inferior status in perpetuity. 
Frequently, the ‘settlers’ in question arrived centuries ago, but those who 
initially granted them land continue to insist on the precept of ‘once 
a stranger, always a stranger’. This has become a bone of contention 
in recent years, with the decision to carve out new districts. Whereas 
central government has chosen new capitals according to notionally 
objective criteria, such as population size, the putative landowners insist 
that there should be respect for the locally sanctioned pecking order. 
Here, we have an example of the collision between state and commu-
nal logics. The Ghanaian conception of citizenship is also a product of 
this particular history. In Ghana, becoming a genuine citizen involves 
two considerations: having been born in the country to two Ghanaian 
parents, but also having a ‘hometown’ where one claims one’s primary 
citizenship. To lack a hometown is almost by deﬁnition to be counted 
as something less than fully Ghanaian. This is why those Lebanese who 
have managed to naturalize and to marry Ghanaians have been tolerated 
rather than fully accepted.32 
The third legacy is that politics in Ghana has assumed a form that is not 
ethnic in any straightforward manner. In fact, traditional areas map onto 
ethnicity only in the loosest sense. In Kenya, where ‘tribes’ were ﬁxed in 
colonial space—that is, the native reserve—land became the key resource 
available for disposal after independence, and this became highly politi-
cized along ethnic lines. It has long played a part in Kenyan electoral 
politics, and lay in part behind the crisis of 2007–08. But because 
the state enjoyed no control over land in Ghana, political competition 
32 There have been numerous instances of deportation since independence. See 
Xerxes Malki, ‘The Alienated Stranger: A Political and Economic History of the 
Lebanese in Ghana, c. 1925–1992’, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2008.
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necessarily assumed a different form. In the 1950s, the Convention 
People’s Party (cpp) dealt with the problem of legitimacy by promis-
ing purposive state intervention in the shape of infrastructure and the 
distribution of social amenities (water supplies, schools etc.). However, 
this was not a game that was invented by the cpp. It was one that the 
British had initiated after 1945, in effect giving the state purchase by 
demonstrating its importance as a facilitator of social ‘betterment’—or 
what some prefer to call modernity. Subsequently, ‘socialist’ planning 
in the 1960s, which hinged on ambitious schemes for state-led indus-
trial development, was intended to create jobs for a growing urban 
population while setting in motion a virtuous circle of self-sufﬁcient 
development. The fact that all of this activity needed to be paid for meant 
that indirect taxes, which fell heavily on cocoa, increased in real terms. 
In the 1950s, the National Liberation Movement (nlm) kicked against 
the use of cocoa revenues to ﬁnance development outside Ashanti. This 
was a period when ethnicity was explicitly mobilized,33 but the electoral 
defeat of the nlm led to the discrediting of ethnic politicking—although 
it did not extinguish the tradition, represented by such ﬁgures as Koﬁ 
Abrefa Busia and J. B. Danquah, which continued to argue for a more 
circumscribed role for the state.
Gambia and Togo
As I have already indicated, Ghana followed a quite different trajectory 
from Togo: whereas a broadly productive social contract emerged in the 
ﬁrst case, in the second there was a return to a coercive mode within 
years of independence. But lest it be thought that this outcome was a 
function of the different national origins of the colonizer, it is instructive 
to consider the case of the Gambia. Here too the state was largely repro-
duced through customs duties, but land and people occupied a much 
more signiﬁcant place in ofﬁcial thinking.34 The British saw themselves 
as having acquired the Gambia through conquest, which conferred the 
moral right to intervene. The authorities constantly fretted about the likely 
cost of administering the Gambia. At an early stage, it was realized that 
the simplest solution lay in encouraging both immigration and seasonal 
33 Jean M. Allman, Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana, 
Madison, wi 1993.
34 Kenneth Swindell and Alieu Jeng, Migrants, Credit and Climate: The Gambian 
Groundnut Trade, 1834–1934, Leiden 2006.
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migration from neighbouring French territory. Settlers and migrants 
would boost the production of groundnuts, which could then be taxed 
at the point of export. At the same time, settlers could be required to 
pay the yard tax, and migrants a special tax, that would together help to 
defray part of the costs of the administration. These taxes were routinely 
manipulated to entice further movements of population out of French 
territory, where head taxes were generally higher. This amounted to an 
extremely effective form of demographic warfare. It also left a distinc-
tive imprint on state–society relations in the Gambia. The British only 
recognized two categories of chief, namely the seyfo (a district chief) and 
the alkalo (a village chief). The latter exercised devolved responsibilities, 
the most important being the maintenance of the tax registers, the col-
lection of tax and the settlement of strangers. By Ghanaian standards, 
these chiefs were weak.
In the Gambia, the limits to state power were initially set by the lack 
of administrative capacity. This was gradually remedied, although the 
French continued to claim that the British showed no real interest in 
possessing the colony. Today, the Jammeh government insists on the 
election of chiefs, which in reality means pre-selecting candidates whose 
accession it favours. Such intervention might be unwelcome, but it is 
not contested as illegitimate—whereas in Ghana it would surely provoke 
outright opposition. Secondly, the discourse of landlord and stranger has 
been almost completely absent in the Gambia. Since colonial times, vil-
lages have become highly mixed entities, with Mandinka, Fula, Jola and 
other peoples sharing the same local space. Strangers have been assimi-
lated remarkably quickly and have enjoyed the same rights as those with 
deeper roots. The best example is the Karoninka, whose origins lie in the 
islands and Karone peninsula of the Casamance (Senegal). They are the 
largest component in many of the villages of the south-western Gambia, 
and they have come to be accepted as ‘indigenous’ despite their rela-
tively recent arrival. Thirdly, ethnicity operates as a mobilizing strategy 
for politicians at the national level, but its salience remains weak in the 
internal politics of most rural communities. 
The control of people and commodities has been central to state-building 
in the Gambia. But each of these has been contingent on parallel devel-
opments in Senegal. As the British empire was being wound down in the 
1960s, the Gambian political elite was encouraged to seek some form 
of association with its larger neighbour. In the end, these negotiations 
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came to nothing.35 Subsequently, the Gambia maintained its independ-
ent existence by astutely playing off the advantages of being enveloped 
by Senegal. In the 1960s, the port of Banjul became a point of entry 
for goods traded legally and illicitly across the international border, with 
consumer items passing in one direction and Senegalese groundnuts 
in the other. While the duties collected at the port helped fund the gov-
ernment budget, the contraband trade provided employment for many 
Gambians. To that extent, the productive contract that came with the 
promise of promoting rural development was buttressed by a permissive 
one. Similarly, the Eyadéma regime in Togo knew that it would never 
enjoy willing support in the south: by establishing Lomé as a free port 
and allowing merchants and petty traders of the capital actively to engage 
in cross-border trade, the quasi-military government won their tacit 
compliance if not their affection. At the same time, the trade through 
Lomé brought money into government coffers that could be recycled as 
development spending in the impoverished north. In Togo, therefore, a 
coercive social contract—according to which Gnassingbé Eyadéma ruled 
through fear and the claim to represent the only barrier between stability 
and an ethnic apocalypse—was married to a permissive one.
Senegal
In Senegal itself, the colonial state was reproduced through the collection 
of customs duties and relatively tight control over land and population. 
The makers of the French empire took the view that the future of the mis-
sion civilisatrice hinged on breaking down indigenous political structures 
and the systems of obligation that underpinned them. This included tak-
ing control of the land and imposing a new institution of chieftaincy. A 
two-tier system of canton and village chiefs was introduced, but unusu-
ally the former ruling lines were cut out of the deal altogether.36 The four 
communes of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Ruﬁsque and Gorée represented an 
anomaly in that their inhabitants were entitled to claim rights of French 
citizenship. Whereas Gold Coast intellectuals regarded themselves as 
defending an autonomous sphere, the citizens of the four communes 
demanded the rights of Frenchmen. Around the turn of the century, 
35 See the account in Jeggan Senghor, The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958–
1994, Oxford 2008.
36 James F. Searing, ‘God Alone is King’: Islam and Emancipation in Senegal: The 
Wolof Kingdoms of Kajoor and Bawol, 1859–1914, Cape Town 2002.
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there were attempts to make claims on French citizenship more restric-
tive, which were naturally resisted by the African populations concerned. 
The issue was resolved during the First World War when Blaise Diagne, 
a Senegalese deputy and minister in the French government, was able to 
trade military enlistment in return for ring-fencing citizenship. 
Outside the four communes, the French initially struggled to ﬁnd will-
ing collaborators. They passed up the possibility of striking alliances 
with the religious leaders, or marabouts, who had long been opposed to 
the ruling houses in the Wolof states. Once again, the First World War 
settled the matter, when the leaders of the Tijani and Mouride brother-
hoods urged their followers to enlist on the side of France.37 The French 
used their appointed chiefs to collect taxes and to secure everyday com-
pliance, but hereafter their real afﬁnity lay with the marabouts. Different 
forms of social contract emerged in the interwar years, reﬂecting an 
over-riding concern with colonial mise en valeur. Prime land along the 
railways was often taken away from pastoralists and re-allocated to the 
Mourides, who engaged in the construction of new religious communi-
ties. The Mourides planted groundnut ﬁelds that were worked by their 
talibés (or followers) in a manner that some have regarded as deeply 
exploitative and others have presented in rather more nuanced terms.38 
In the Casamance, by contrast, the operative social contract was coercive. 
The French demand for head taxes and for military recruits was actively 
resisted by the Jola right through to the 1930s, fostering a tradition of 
opposition to the centre that continues to this day. Indirect taxes, derived 
largely from groundnut exports, supported the budget of the French 
West African Federation as a whole, whereas the head taxes, which were 
levied as if the very credibility of the empire rested upon them, sustained 
the Senegalese territorial administration. 
Over time, the lone French administrator backed up by a handful of sol-
diers came to be supported by the fabric of a functioning bureaucracy. 
But the legacy for independent Senegal, as Boone makes clear, was a very 
uneven pattern of state penetration. The arid zones were largely left to 
their own devices, especially where they did not contribute signiﬁcantly 
37 Christopher Harrison, France and Islam in West Africa, 1860–1960, Cambridge 
1988.
38 Donal Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic 
Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood, Oxford 1971; Jean Copans, Les marabouts de 
l’arachide: la confrérie et les paysans du Sénégal, Paris 1980.
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to revenues. The Casamance continued to be considered as a geographi-
cal anomaly that could only be deﬁnitively resolved once the Gambia was 
fully merged into Senegal. Whereas its highly productive rice culture was 
not considered worthy of support, resources continued to be channelled 
into the groundnut basin despite growing evidence of soil degradation. 
Strikingly, the political alliance with the brotherhoods continued under 
Socialist Party rule. The latter expected the marabouts to bring out the 
rural vote in return for being granted privileged access to resources and a 
free hand in dealing with their followers. The Mouride leadership played 
this game most astutely. Their headquarters at Touba became a virtual 
state-within-a-state, sometimes equated with the Vatican. Here, even 
the most basic functions of policing were carried out by the Mourides.39 
Bargaining with the state became explicit around the time of the decla-
ration of groundnut prices, with the marabouts negotiating openly on 
behalf of the farmers. 
The Senegalese case is like that of Ghana to the extent that the domi-
nant spokesmen of rural interests were never part of the state structure. 
Indeed, their independence was what granted them their bargaining 
power. However, this distance also conferred a considerable measure of 
legitimacy on the system as a whole. In Senegal, politicians were forced 
explicitly to recognize the limits of state power as much as they might 
have preferred a freer hand.40 Senegal was also like the Gambia in that 
rural communities coalesced in a way that assumed the rights of people to 
settle where land was available. The language of autochthony was equally 
muted. But because the Wolof predominated within the Mourides, gov-
ernment policy tended to favour Wolof interests in practice. This was 
accentuated by rapid rates of migration to Dakar, especially after the col-
lapse of the groundnut economy in the 1980s. Here, Wolof consolidated 
itself as the undisputed language of the street. Although there was a 
backlash in the Casamance in the 1990s, ‘Woloﬁzation’ was remark-
ably successful in providing a focus for Senegalese identity. But as with 
Ghana’s ‘unwritten constitution’, this was never an explicit dimension of 
the state-building project: it was rather an effect produced by the interac-
tion between religious authorities and political leaders at the elite level, 
and the social networks produced by urban youth at the ‘subaltern’ level. 
39 In recent times there has been resistance to the creation of state schools in the 
town. On Touba, see Eric Ross, Suﬁ City: Urban Design and Archetypes in Touba, 
Rochester 2006; and Cheikh Guèye, Touba: la capitale des Mourides, Paris 2002.
40 Leonardo Villalón, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens 
in Fatick, Cambridge 2006.
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The system worked insofar as the grands marabouts were able to control 
their youthful constituency.
Patterns
Returning to the literature on African states, two conclusions can now 
be drawn. Firstly, contra Englebert, although the countries in question 
emerged out of a colonial partition that created geographical anomalies—
most obviously in the shape of the minuscule Gambia—new forms of 
legitimacy did emerge out of the compromises that were struck. These 
contracts were mostly renewed at the time of independence, although 
additional bargains were entered into. In Ghana, politicians were forced 
to acknowledge that the state had deﬁnite limits, especially when it came 
to land and taxation. In the Gambia, where taxes and land were claimed 
as state business, the maintenance of open borders and the positive 
encouragement given to settlers produced a different kind of consensus. 
This was to some extent evident in Senegal as well, but the difference 
was that more of an attempt was made to manage land as a produc-
tive resource. Revenue imperatives and political convenience led to the 
emergence of a strategic alliance in which Senegalese rulers were forced 
to accept the relative autonomy of the Muslim brotherhoods.
In a nutshell, these cases represent three signiﬁcantly different com-
binations of productive, coercive and permissive social contracts. As a 
concept, neo-patrimonialism is not precise enough to shed light on such 
differences. Moreover, it obscures the important point that it was a con-
sensus about what the state was not empowered to do that was often 
more important for forging political legitimacy. The de facto respect for 
chieﬂy autonomy in Ghana and for distinct religious spaces in Senegal, 
neither of which was written into constitutional documents (at least until 
1992 in Ghana), underlines the importance of seeing institutions not as 
abstract things, but as the product of social practice. The second overall 
ﬁnding is that although administrative structures were bent to accom-
modate the compromises that were struck, this should not be considered 
a weakness or as evidence for the ‘criminalization of the state’. On the 
contrary, these adjustments were conducive to state consolidation in the 
ﬁrst decades of independence. 
Venturing beyond the four speciﬁc cases, how well can this model 
cope with the complex variations in the rest of Africa in the decade 
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immediately after independence? In the early years, the push for ‘devel-
opment’ enabled regimes to claim legitimacy on the basis of the beneﬁts 
that they would bring to ordinary citizens. This was typically married to 
the formal declaration of a one-party state, which was promoted on the 
basis that unity was a prerequisite for development (as in Tanzania). In 
the ﬁrst decade and a half, there was an impressive expansion of health 
and educational facilities across national space; such things had hitherto 
been the preserve of the urban few. Political debate within the one-party 
state was, however, conﬁned to implementation rather than addressing 
the fundamentals of the agenda itself.
In those countries that embraced the capitalist path to development, an 
acceptance of the basic premise of social inequality potentially made the 
package a harder sell. But in countries like Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, a 
balance of sorts was struck. While government sought to create a posi-
tive environment for external investors, which was expected to provide 
the necessary impetus for growth, it was also necessary to satisfy diverse 
domestic constituencies. The Kenyan scenario was one in which scarce 
land was carefully parcelled out to different ethnic constituencies—with 
members of the political class beneﬁting alongside some redistribu-
tion to landless peasants. In Côte d’Ivoire migrants from the north 
of the country and from Burkina Faso were encouraged to relocate to 
the forest zone where they could work on cocoa farms and potentially 
become independent producers in their own right. Whereas in Ghana, 
the assumption was that being a stranger was a perpetual condition, the 
regime of Félix Houphouët-Boigny left the status of northern migrants 
deliberately vague—with serious consequences for the future.41
Finally, external actors played their own part in inscribing the contract: 
hence the close involvement of the Nordic states in Tanzania, and the 
co-operation agreements that bound France to her former colonies, 
were crucial in enabling incumbent regimes to be seen to deliver. 
Whereas development co-operation at the level of line Ministries was 
intended to strengthen administrative capacity, at the level of high poli-
tics French governments openly fed the personalist styles of their allies 
41 On land and citizenship in Côte d’Ivoire, see Ruth Marshall-Fratani, ‘The War of 
“Who Is Who”: Autochthony and Citizenship in the Ivorian Crisis’, in Sara Dorman, 
Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent, eds, Making Nations, Creating Strangers: State 
and Citizenship in Africa, Leiden 2007, pp. 38–44.
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like Omar Bongo in Gabon, Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Eyadéma in Togo.
Secondly, there were cases where coercive contracts re-asserted them-
selves in an unambiguous form. In Equatorial Guinea, Francisco Macias 
Nguema governed his tiny state primarily through fear, as did Ahmed 
Sekou Touré in Guinea and Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African 
Republic. In such countries, a system of informers relayed rumour and 
real expressions of discontent to the security agencies. The primary 
objective of citizens was to avoid being noticed by representatives of the 
state at all. Participating in public veneration of the leader when required 
to do so was the minimum price that had to be paid. However, in most 
African countries, incumbent regimes needed to rely on something 
rather more nuanced than violence. Indeed, it is instructive to note that 
as the grip of Sekou Touré weakened in the 1970s, he was forced to repo-
sition himself as a faithful Muslim in an attempt to recapture some lost 
moral authority. Somewhat counter-intuitively, military regimes were 
not necessarily the ones most inclined to coercion. Military juntas were 
typically vulnerable to counter-coups and often felt it necessary to strike 
up tactical alliances with civilian constituencies.
Finally, the permissive social contract was a pervasive phenomenon. It 
was a particular feature of West Africa, where micro-states enjoyed direct 
access to the sea.42 There were many other micro-states in Africa—
notably Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho and Swaziland—but these were 
landlocked entities that only existed by virtue of the desire of colonial 
powers to preserve the inner nuclei of pre-colonial kingdoms. In Rwanda 
and Burundi, the monarchies were dispensed with in short order, and 
the social contract came to rest on appeals to core Hutu and Tutsi con-
stituencies respectively (again through ‘development’), combined with 
the threat of violence against potential dissidents from the other group. 
The combination of a productive and a coercive social contract, targeted 
at different constituencies, was rather unusual and was indicative of a 
ﬁssure within the body politic. Beyond the micro-states, the permissive 
social contract was exempliﬁed more broadly in the manner in which 
border zones were largely left to their own devices. In countries as varied 
as Mobutu’s Zaire and Nyerere’s Tanzania, the realities of contraband 
42 This was true of Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau as well, although the fact 
that these remained European colonies until 1968 and 1974 respectively perpetu-
ated an entirely different dynamic.
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underwrote tacit understandings between the political centre and the 
geographical margins.43
3. social contracts under strain
The standard narrative of the post-independence period highlights a 
serious rupture in the mid-1970s. Devastating drought, especially in 
the Sahel and the Horn, together with the opec-induced oil shocks, 
placed African economies under severe strain. The argument that it 
was simply misplaced development priorities, and not external shocks, 
that created the crisis is one that has few defenders today—at least in 
any simple form.44 The upshot was the almost universal adoption of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (saps) in the mid-1980s and 1990s 
that completely rewrote the rules.45 Rather than revisit the debate about 
adjustment, I will conﬁne myself here to a consideration of how these 
processes impacted on state–society relations.
Most obviously, the productive contracts that had been built around 
state-led economic development and the promise of improved educa-
tion, health and infrastructure ran into serious trouble. Even countries 
that had recorded sustained economic growth, such as Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire, experienced a signiﬁcant change of fortunes. In most countries 
other than the oil states, government revenues went into sharp decline, 
making it increasingly difﬁcult to deliver on the promises of ‘develop-
ment’. In the worst cases, state ofﬁcials ceased to be paid on time and 
were forced to resort to various forms of moonlighting and graft to keep 
themselves aﬂoat. Interestingly, however, the micro-states were often 
able to weather the shocks more easily, arguably not for reasons of size 
per se (in the manner of Herbst), but because they were already geared 
to exploiting commercial ﬂows. In the Gambia, even greater encourage-
ment was given to the contraband trade, despite Senegalese government 
43 Janet MacGaffey, The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling and 
Other Unofﬁcial Activities to National Wealth, London 1991.
44 For a statement on the causes of the crisis that crystallized a way of viewing 
Africa and which informed Structural Adjustment regimes, see the ‘Berg Report’: 
World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, 
Washington, dc 1981. For a more recent and nuanced account, see Robert Bates, 
When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa, Cambridge 2008.
45 See my Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History, Houndmills 2004, 
chapter 8.
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46 See my Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana, New York 1995.
complaints about what this was doing to their manufacturing industry. 
Tourism became the second Gambian money-earner, whereas ground-
nut production lost much of its allure. Similarly, there was a period of 
boom in Lomé in the late 1970s: at a time of acute consumer short-
ages in Ghana, there was proﬁtable trade to be had from smuggling just 
about everything, from sugar to pomade, across the border. 
On the other side of the line, of course, it was a different story. In the 
1970s, the Ghanaian economy went into freefall. Although exogenous 
shocks were crucial, attempts at managing the crisis propelled things 
from bad to worse. Hence, printing money in order to deal with liquid-
ity problems merely had the effect of driving up inﬂation. Raising 
taxes on cocoa—both directly and through systematic overvaluation 
of the currency—induced farmers to withdraw from the market. This 
compounded the shrinkage of state revenues, producing the knock-on 
effects of a deteriorating infrastructure, demoralized public employees 
and a breakdown of core public services. At the same time, the loss of 
foreign-exchange earnings meant that state industries were unable to 
import sufﬁcient raw materials and spare parts. Their cumulative losses 
became a further drain on the public exchequer, thereby completing 
the vicious circle.
Although the social contract was sorely tested, especially under military 
rule, crucially it never unravelled. The emergence of Flt-Lt Jerry Rawlings 
ended up producing an element of continuity within change. In 1979, 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (afrc) insisted that the blame 
lay with economic saboteurs, including senior military ofﬁcers who had 
proﬁted from the economic slide. After Rawlings’s second coming on 
31 December 1981, this rather simplistic message was buttressed by 
an attempt at building structures of ‘people’s power’ that would make 
ordinary Ghanaians watchdogs of the public good. But despite the dec-
larations of revolutionary intent, there was never any serious attempt 
to challenge the terms of the ‘unwritten constitution’ outlined above. It 
is true that the chiefs were not permitted to join the People’s Defence 
Committees (pdcs), and there was an attempt by cadres to assert control 
over land revenues, but in signiﬁcant respects it was business as usual. 
The chiefs continued to exercise considerable inﬂuence over local affairs 
(including land), whereas the structures of popular power concentrated 
on the management of politics at the District level and above.46
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There was a rift within the regime in 1982–83 that brought about 
the purge of the so-called ‘ultra-leftists’. The revamped Provisional 
National Defence Council (pndc) continued to insist on the impor-
tance of Ghanaians taking control of their lives, through involvement 
in the renamed Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (cdrs) 
and the People’s Militia. But at the same time, a technocratic elite in 
core Ministries quietly brokered the country’s adoption of an Economic 
Recovery Programme. The latter proved crucial in that the injection of 
substantial levels of World Bank and bilateral assistance enabled the bat-
tered economic infrastructure of the economy to be rebuilt. The pndc 
extracted political capital from road building, while the decision to 
provide electricity to all the District capitals was especially popular in 
the north, which had been all but left off the national grid. Although 
many workers were retrenched in the early years, the wages and condi-
tions of service of those who remained in public employment gradually 
improved. The net result was that a demoralized civil service recovered 
some of its sense of professional pride and institutional presence.
However, the retraction of the state from the economic sphere also had 
more damaging consequences. In the 1980s, most of the support for 
peasant agriculture was withdrawn on the basis that subsidies bred 
price distortions. This had a detrimental impact on peasant agriculture, 
and contributed to a mounting food import bill. In the 1990s, pressure 
was placed upon government to privatize state enterprises, wholly or 
partially, as part of the package of conditionalities. This meant that the 
Nkrumahist vision of the state as an engine of development was effec-
tively disabled. The Bretton Woods institutions predicted that inward 
foreign investment and reinvigorated local entrepreneurship would take 
up the slack, but this happened in an uneven manner. Manufacturing 
and food production never entirely recovered, whereas gold mining 
and the cocoa economy ﬂourished. However, government revenues cov-
ered only 56 per cent of spending in 2000, which meant that the state 
remained heavily dependent on external aid.
In Ghana, a broad societal consensus always existed that did not entirely 
conform to the agendas of the multilateral institutions. This included the 
expectation that it remained the function of the state to deliver key public 
goods—notably health, education and infrastructure—while embracing 
the principle that government ought to allow prices and currency rates to 
ﬁnd their own levels. At the same time as government worked to reduce 
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the national debt and attract investment, chiefs and local leaders were 
expected to be pro-active in promoting development agendas in their 
own communities. The District Assemblies, which were the focal point 
of a decentralization agenda, notionally functioned as the hinge. At the 
start of the 1990s, the pndc considered that it was safe to contemplate a 
return to open political competition. The National Democratic Congress 
(ndc) was founded as a political party and won the 1992 and 1996 elec-
tions. In 2000, the ndc lost to the New Patriotic Party (npp), the party 
representing the Busia/Danquah tradition. In signiﬁcant respects, how-
ever, the npp borrowed the ndc agenda, as we will see.
Dakar’s dilemmas
Senegal witnessed neither the same precipitous decline nor the rela-
tively speedy recovery. From the 1970s, there was a steady process of 
attrition as the Sahelian drought bit hard, petroleum prices impacted on 
state industries, and the combination of soil degradation in the ground-
nut basin and low producer prices brought about a decline in the rural 
export economy. As a consequence, Senegal began to experience an 
accelerated drift of impoverished peasants to the city. Dakar grew very 
rapidly, but the fastest-growing urban area was the Mouride capital of 
Touba. The Mouride message of salvation through physical work in the 
groundnut ﬁelds was re-cast as the brotherhood increasingly became 
an urban network centred on these cities, but also Florence, Barcelona, 
Paris and New York. Within Senegal, the social contract came under 
acute strain when adjustment failed to produce a signiﬁcant reversal 
in economic fortunes.
The Socialist government of Abdou Diouf faced a particular dilemma 
over the contraband trade. Much of the smuggling was organized from 
Touba, while the goods ended up on the streets of Dakar where they 
were sold on by petty traders who belonged to the Mourides. Adopting 
a permissive social contract would have meant allowing this activity to 
continue, but the net effect would be to undermine efforts to protect 
Senegalese enterprises. On the other hand, sealing the border would 
alienate a signiﬁcant section of the Senegalese population whose live-
lihoods were bound up with trade. Ultimately, Senegalese ofﬁcialdom 
emitted contradictory signals, declaring a war on smuggling at the bor-
der while looking the other way when contraband goods reached the 
city. Meanwhile, urban youth who mostly lived off precarious street 
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trading became increasingly restive and unwilling to acknowledge the 
pretensions of the Socialist Party. When the grands marabouts began to 
withhold their customary injunctions to vote Socialist, the game was up. 
In 2000, Diouf was defeated at the polls by a coalition of interests that 
had been alienated by the former regime. 
This was a story that was repeated in many other African countries 
where even well-ensconced regimes suffered a severe crisis of legiti-
macy in the early 1990s. The diagnosis that patron–client networks 
unravelled as sources of patronage dried up presumes, as I have already 
noted, that there was a stable pattern of resource ﬂows—which has yet 
to be proved. Moreover, even if such patterns did exist, one might argue 
that the political effects of redistribution under conditions of resource 
scarcity might even have been enhanced. In that sense, the logic is ques-
tionable. Arguably, the crisis came down to other kinds of factors: in 
Benin, it was the inability of the government to pay its workers that was 
a catalyst for a series of strikes that weakened the regime; in Zambia, 
it was austerity and high food prices that led the trade unions to make 
a break with the ruling party; and in countless other cases it was the 
political paralysis of the old guard, and/or inﬁghting over political suc-
cession, that both produced damaging splits and breakaways (Kenya and 
Cameroon) and elicited outspoken criticisms from churches (Malawi) 
and other interest groups.
In short, it was the failure of incumbent regimes to deal with issues of 
material hardship and to project an image of purposeful leadership that 
led to a series of National Conferences in the Francophone states and to 
national elections in the Anglophone ones. The fact that the external envi-
ronment had altered with the ending of the Cold War, of course, removed 
the rug from under the feet of many embattled regimes. What followed 
is well known. In some cases, the old ruling parties were voted out of 
power (Benin and Zambia); in other cases (Cameroon), they managed 
to weather the storm; and in still others (most dramatically in Rwanda) 
democratization culminated in a complete political breakdown. If there 
is one lesson that has emerged from the decade and a half since the 
early 1990s, it is that regular elections do not of themselves bring politi-
cal stability, or even greater accountability. In a number of instances, 
the former opposition behaved much like those they had replaced, as 
was the case in Zambia under Frederick Chiluba. The countries where 
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democracy has functioned best are those where elements of older social 
contracts have been signiﬁcantly reworked to suit changed times. 
4. in search of new social contracts
In this ﬁnal section, I consider the prospects for the emergence of new 
social contracts across Africa. There are two reasons for addressing this 
issue now. First of all, there is a growing sense that the current interna-
tional aid regime is not working, and that this has consequences that are 
as much political as economic.47 Although some countries had experi-
enced consecutive years of impressive growth prior to the current global 
downturn, there is little evidence that they are becoming any less aid-
dependent. Moreover, in many countries, decades of economic reform 
have continued to produce disappointing results. The multilateral and 
bilateral donors and African recipients have become almost equally 
weary. Moreover, Structural Adjustment has not helped to make govern-
ments any more accountable to their citizens.
Those who believe that economic reform and political liberalization are 
natural bedfellows might point to the democratic takeoff in the 1990s. 
But as I have indicated, popular dissent was directed against regimes 
that had presided over increasing hardship, some of which was associ-
ated with the adjustment regime itself. Strict conditionalities also meant 
that there was relatively little scope for political parties to debate policy 
when it came to election time. As a result, the polls were often heavily 
dominated by personality and image rather than competing visions for 
an alternative future. Moreover, once the parliamentarians were safely 
installed in their respective legislatures, they found that the executive 
branch paid them scant attention. The story of Africa’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (prsps) is one in which mps have been expected to 
rubber-stamp documents written according to a standard template, 
despite the cosy discourse of African ownership.48 For governments, it 
has been more important to satisfy the international institutions than to 
listen to the elected representatives. The relationship between economic 
47 Among a number of books on the subject, see Jonathan Glennie, The Trouble 
With Aid: Why Less Could Mean More for Africa, London 2008.
48 Lindsay Whitﬁeld, ‘Trustees of Development from Conditionality to Governance: 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 
43, no. 4, 2005, pp. 641–64.
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restructuring and political accountability is therefore much more indi-
rect than the boosters of reform have been willing to admit. 
The second reason for raising the issue is that a number of new factors 
are entering the equation which make it unlikely that things can continue 
in their present form. Three may be singled out: hyper-urbanization, 
migration and climate change. Whereas Africa used to be a continent of 
peasant farmers, it is the cities that command the demographic majority 
in a growing number of countries. The pace at which Africa’s primary 
cities have grown is extraordinary, but Touba exempliﬁes the equally 
impressive growth of many secondary cities. Given that forward plan-
ning became impossible during the adjustment years, serious health 
issues are now arising from the conjuncture between inadequate and 
contaminated water supplies, creaking waste-disposal systems and 
extreme congestion.49 In most countries, including South Africa, the 
power grid is already overburdened, and urbanization is likely to place an 
even greater strain on supply in the future. The need for a return to sys-
tematic urban planning, of a kind that shaped Dakar and Abidjan in the 
1960s, could not be more obvious. The World Bank’s 2009 Development 
Report maintains that megacities should be seen as the dynamos for eco-
nomic growth, and that Africa’s prospects for real development hinge on 
the creation of more urbanized ‘agglomeration economies’. Such a vision 
plainly risks fetishizing the megacity and the liberating effects of inte-
grated transport systems, but it does at least recognize the importance of 
substantial investment in urban transportation and social amenities.
The second related development is that a signiﬁcant section of the 
African population is now located outside of its country of origin. 
Migration within Africa is nothing new, but what is comparatively recent 
is the emergence of signiﬁcant diasporas living abroad. This includes 
Somalis, Congolese and Nigerians in South Africa; Senegalese, Malians 
and Ghanaians in Europe; and Ethiopians and Eritreans in the United 
States. Most of these diasporic communities remain connected with 
home, to which they remit considerable sums of money. The new demo-
graphic realities raise fundamental questions about the associated rights 
and responsibilities of national citizenship. Finally, if current climate 
projections are correct, there will be further desiccation within the Sahel 
49 T. C. McCaskie, ‘“Water wars” in Kumase, Ghana’, in Francesca Locatelli and Paul 
Nugent, eds, African Cities: Competing Claims on Urban Spaces, Leiden 2009.
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and the Horn, which will, in all likelihood, push pastoralists into zones 
currently claimed by farming groups, thereby raising the potential for 
resource-based conﬂicts. The pressure for control of water supplies is 
also likely to become an inter-state issue, given that many international 
boundaries follow water-courses. 
The neo-liberal agenda that has prevailed since the 1980s has tended 
to regard the African state as being inherently unequal to the task of 
tackling the big issues. Urging African governments to make way for 
private capital and ngos has been the preferred option, although there 
have been sporadic efforts at rebuilding bureaucratic capacity. What has 
resulted from governance reform is often the worst of both worlds, as 
indicated by Nicolas van de Walle:
In fact, there is little evidence that the central states of the region have refo-
cused their activities onto a narrower, more ‘public’ set of activities, except 
for a limited amount of privatization and deregulation that has occurred. 
Instead, what is emerging is often an effectively privatized delivery system 
that exists side by side with a hollowed out public system that continues to 
receive public resources (albeit inadequate ones) whether or not it actually 
produces services.50
Van de Walle’s argument in favour of inserting the state back into the 
equation is one that seems eminently sensible. However, this also 
has to be done in a way that encourages African states to re-connect 
with their own populations. 
Sovereignty and development
Here, I want to propose what could be thought of as some minimum pre-
conditions for meaningful change. The ﬁrst is that African governments 
need to ﬁnd ways of raising more revenue themselves, for two reasons: 
because health, education and infrastructure need greater resources; and 
because taxation provides the occasion for bargaining between the state 
and its citizens.51 A perpetuation of aid dependency stands in the way, 
50 Nicolas van de Walle, ‘Introduction: The State and African Development’, in van 
de Walle, Nicole Ball and Vijaya Ramachandran, eds, Beyond Structural Adjustment 
in Africa: The Institutional Context of African Development, New York 2003, p. 19.
51 Mick Moore, ‘Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on 
Taxation and Governance’, in Deborah Bräutigam, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Mick 
Moore, Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent, 
Cambridge 2008.
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because it reproduces a form of extraversion that is as deleterious as the 
effects of rents in the oil-rich states. Tax reform is very much on the inter-
national agenda, and some lessons have already been learned. One is 
that African states need to develop diverse and ﬂexible taxation systems. 
External pressure to reduce customs tariffs in a country such as Kenya has 
led to lower than expected revenue, whereas these should be complemen-
tary to other forms of revenue-gathering.52 Secondly, the present fashion 
for semi-autonomous revenue authorities may improve efﬁciency, but it 
weakens the link between revenue collection and service delivery.53 And 
ﬁnally, taxation systems have paid insufﬁcient attention to social inequali-
ties that have reached acute levels in many African countries. The gated 
communities springing up across African cities contrast only too starkly 
with the sprawling slums. Placing Value-Added Tax (vat) on luxury goods 
is one way of taxing the rich, but the latter are otherwise highly adept at 
escaping the revenue net. Taxing ﬁxed property is one area in which gains 
could be made, given that urban real estate has become one of the most 
important foci of investment. Another obvious area where revenue could 
be raised is by the state tapping some of the earnings from the diaspora. 
Trading citizenship rights, including the vote and identity documents, in 
return for the payment of taxes is something that is within the grasp of 
African states, as the success of Eritrea demonstrates.
Secondly, an enhanced role for the state in service delivery cannot be 
avoided given the growing public-health issues arising out of urbaniza-
tion. There are some services that it may be better to contract out, such 
as urban waste collection, but the public authorities (in this case munici-
pal ones) need to be accountable for the quality of that service alongside 
the companies concerned. World Bank pressure to privatize urban water 
supply has met with popular resistance because of a widespread feeling 
that something as basic as water should not be a source of private gain.54 
In reality, the water multinationals have shown limited interest in man-
aging African supplies, except when they have been granted generous 
risk guarantees. Whether they are more cost-effective is therefore highly 
52 Nic Cheeseman and Robert Grifﬁths, Increasing Tax Revenue in the Developing 
World: The Case of Kenya, ocgg Project Paper 05–05, Oxford 2005.
53 Fjeldstad and Moore, ‘Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 47, no. 1, 2009.
54 Lindsay Whitﬁeld, ‘The Politics of Urban Water Reform in Ghana’, Review of 
African Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 109, 2006; E. Osei Kwadwo Prempeh, Against 
Global Capitalism: African Social Movements Confront Neoliberal Globalization, 
Aldershot 2006.
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debatable.55 When it comes to electricity, the need for substantial infra-
structural investments and, above all, strategic planning also presume 
an important role for the state.56 Although the private educational sector 
is growing rapidly, there is a widespread consensus that it is the duty of 
the state to set educational targets and to be the primary provider of edu-
cation at all levels. Similarly, there is an expectation that the state should 
be primarily responsible for the provision of basic health facilities.
Thirdly, the role of the state in supporting African agriculture needs to 
be revisited. Structural Adjustment reforms have sometimes been good 
for the cash-crop sector, but the other side of the story is that food pro-
duction has lagged behind population growth. Relying on market forces 
may make sense for farmers located close to urban centres, but the costs 
of transport have tended to penalize rural producers who are more off the 
beaten track.57 As soaring global food prices have underlined, it is risky 
to rely entirely upon external supplies. The rebuilding of agricultural 
extension services, which were killed off under Structural Adjustment, 
and improved access to subsidized inputs and bank credit are absolutely 
essential accompaniments to infrastructural development. The alterna-
tive is a progressively larger import bill and further depopulation of the 
countryside. Land reform is currently on the agenda of the World Bank, 
which is seeking to persuade African countries of the need to embrace 
titling in order to simplify land-management systems and permit land to 
be used as a form of collateral. In some countries, such intervention may 
be feasible, but at the interface between agriculture and pastoralism it is 
likely to lead to further land enclosure at the expense of herders. In fact, 
there is often a need for a greater appreciation of multiple and overlapping 
rights in land—in other words, more complexity rather than less—
which is entirely at odds with Bank instincts. Embracing legal pluralism 
again presupposes institutions that can broker new land-management 
systems and underwrite resulting agreements. Similarly, the reality 
that cross-boundary resource-use is essential for ensuring the ongoing 
55 Kate Bayliss, ‘Private Sector Participation in African Infrastructure: Is It Worth 
the Risk?’, ipc-ig Working Paper 55, 2009.
56 In April 2010, the World Bank made an unprecedented loan of $3.5bn to eskom, 
the state electricity provider in South Africa, to construct a new coal-ﬁred power 
station, following the failure of private capital to plug the energy gap. The loan has 
been immensely controversial on environmental grounds; less commented upon is 
the tacit admission that public utilities may in fact be the only option.
57 For evidence from Tanzania, see Stefano Ponte, Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: 
How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa, Oxford 2002.
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livelihoods of pastoralists and farmers alike underlines the importance 
of state actors in creating binding rules.
The task of rebuilding state institutions is not purely a technocratic 
exercise because it ultimately hinges on Africans renewing their faith in 
public institutions. The chances of success are likely to depend on sensi-
tivity to popular understandings of the role of the state. In fundamental 
respects, there is a divergence between the neo-liberal expectation of the 
limited state and the conceptions of limits to state power that I have 
mapped in this article: whereas the former hinges on the idea that states 
should seek to do less in the economic and social spheres, in countries 
like Ghana and Senegal the emphasis is on a state that is pro-active, but 
which respects autonomous social spaces. The latter is the platform on 
which new permutations of state–society engagement need to be built. 
The case of Ghana reveals how it is possible to introduce signiﬁcant 
innovations, while respecting elements of an older set of social contracts. 
On the other hand, the case of Senegal—where the regime of Abdoulaye 
Wade has fallen back upon the Mouride network—demonstrates the 
problems with standing still. That is, while the political elite and the 
grands marabouts have returned to the cosy relationship of the Senghor 
and Diouf years, there are signs of a growing gulf between the religious 
leadership and its constituency among disaffected urban youth.
Those of an Afro-pessimist persuasion might argue that the changes 
outlined here are bound to founder on the reality that so much of the 
population is too poor to pay higher taxes, while malfunctioning bureauc-
racies cannot be expected to reform themselves. Although Ghanaians 
have a history of aversion to direct taxation, and have witnessed more 
than their fair share of state failure, a renewed social contract is in the 
process of emerging. The Rawlings regime introduced vat, largely as a 
response to international pressure, as early as 1995. In the face of street 
protests, fomented by the opposition, the ndc government was forced 
to suspend vat, but later reintroduced it at the lower rate of 12.5 per cent 
(down from 17.5 per cent). After the election of the npp in 2000, the 
Kufuor regime reversed its stance and even decided to raise vat levels in 
order to pay for improvements in educational infrastructure. In 2004, 
Kufuor went into fresh elections promising a further vat increase in 
order to permit investment in improved social amenities—and he won 
handsomely. The npp also began the difﬁcult process of raising revenue 
from the informal sector.
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Voting for higher taxes would have seemed inconceivable only a short 
time before, but this change of political strategy reﬂected a canny 
understanding of what motivated the average Ghanaian voter. During 
its second term, the npp also rolled out a National Health Insurance 
Scheme (nhis), although the latter had in fact been piloted by the 
Rawlings regime in 1997–98.58 The underlying contention was that there 
were simply not the resources available for the state to bear the entire 
costs of health delivery, while the ‘cash and carry’ system was regarded 
as inequitable. Although a safety net was to remain for the poorest sec-
tions of society, the implication was that Ghanaians would need to pick 
up the tab for their own health needs and to plan their lives accordingly. 
As with vat, the npp banked on the willingness of Ghanaians to accept 
higher ﬁnancial outlays in return for a better service. The fact that an 
earlier pilot scheme failed due to a lack of popular trust was an indica-
tion that Ghanaians needed some convincing. In 2008, the npp lost 
the elections, but not because of the nhis. On the contrary, uptake was 
ahead of schedule (estimated at around 48 per cent), suggesting a broad 
acceptance of health reform.59 Signiﬁcantly, the Mills government has 
since announced the creation of a National Health Insurance Project to 
facilitate implementation of the nhis.60 
The rebuilding of state institutions has been important to this success, 
as has the existence of a competitive political system. But at a more 
profound level, what is crucial is that the broad social consensus that 
took shape over the past century has adapted to the changes over the 
last twenty years. The Ghanaian example cannot simply be replicated 
elsewhere, and many structural problems remain—especially in respect 
of urban planning—but the salient point is that African countries can 
break out of the regressive cycle. For this to happen, however, abandon-
ing many of the neo-liberal orthodoxies about the inherent evils of the 
state will be essential.
58 Daniel Kojo Arhinful, The Solidarity of Self-Interest: Social and Cultural Feasibility 
of Rural Health Insurance in Ghana, Leiden 2003, pp. 60–4.
59 By contrast, the take-up in Tanzania has been slower, in part because the ﬁnancial 
outlays are higher than for user fees and there is less choice between health service 
providers. Deograsias Mushi, Financing Public Health Care: Insurance, User Fees or 
Taxes? Welfare Comparisons in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 2007.
60 ‘Government to address policy issues of nhis’, Ghana Web, 23 June 2009.
